UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/1418
14 December 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 DECEMBER 1994 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 724 (1991) CONCERNING YUGOSLAVIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the Security Council Committee establishing pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia, I wish to bring to your attention the following urgent matter. The Acting Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) informed the Committee, by a letter dated 13 December 1994, copy attached, of a major resurgence of diphtheria in several countries in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and that the only available stocks of anti-serum to combat this serious, in fact life-threatening, situation are located in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Therefore the Acting Executive Director of UNICEF requested the Committee to facilitate action to approve through the appropriate channels the shipment of 12,000 vials of diphtheria anti-serum from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for use in the affected countries.

Given the urgency of the matter, the members immediately considered it the same day, at the 114th meeting of the Committee. Having recalled that the provisions contained in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular those of sub-paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 757 (1992), explicitly prescribe that all States shall prevent the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the members noted that the matter fails under exclusive authority of the Security Council. Taking into account the exceptional humanitarian circumstances of the situation, the Committee decided to recommend to the Security Council, if that would be the wish of the Council, the adoption of a resolution which would permit, for a period of 30 days from the date of its adoption, the export of diphtheria anti-serum from that country, in the quantities requested by UNICEF, namely, 12,000 vials. It was further decided to recommend that any payments for such authorized shipments shall be made only into frozen accounts.

Accordingly, again on behalf of the Committee, I would be obliged if the Committee's recommendations could be considered by the members of the Security Council as a matter of urgency.

(Signed) Ronaldo Mota SARDENBERG
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 724 (1991)
concerning Yugoslavia

Annex

Letter dated 13 December 1994 from the Acting Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) addressed to the Chairman of Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia

Approval of Shipment of Diphtheria Anti-Serum from Yugoslavia

I am writing in order to request the Committee to facilitate action to approve through the appropriate channels the shipment of diphtheria anti-serum from Yugoslavia.

1. There has been a major resurgence of diphtheria in the Central Asian and Eastern European countries. Up to 40,000 cases are expected to be officially registered in the NIS countries this year, compared to 3,170 cases in 1990 and 19,046 cases in 1993. This has been widely reported in the international press (see for example New York Times of 29 November 1994). Currently, WHO estimates that 50,000 people will contract the disease next year. The mortality rate is 5% to 10%.

2. The international community has undertaken a significant effort to meet this challenge, and plans were recently coordinated at the Inter-Agency Immunization Coordination Committee (IICC) which reviewed this issue in Amsterdam on 11-12 November. The IICC includes the EU, other European Governments, USAID, Japan, the World Bank, NGOs, and UN agencies.

One critical bottleneck is the availability of diphtheria anti-serum, used to treat individuals who have already contracted the disease. The anti-serum is a blood product that requires a production time of six months (in contrast, diphtheria vaccine - used to prevent the disease - is also in short supply, but can be manufactured with much shorter delays). The anti-serum is usually frozen and stored for a lengthy period. However, a combination of dramatically rising cases and the declining production capacity in Eastern Europe has led to a near exhaustion of stocks.

UNICEF has contacted the major suppliers of anti-serum in Europe, North America, and Asia (a list of 14 such suppliers is attached). All of these suppliers have informed UNICEF that they have no anti-serum stocks available and no prospects for the immediate future. A few smaller suppliers have very small quantities available (e.g., 800 vials were identified in Croatia). Some suppliers have begun to resume production and may have quantities available in a few months (UNICEF will have to confirm the quality), at which time the shortage could be eased.

3. One supplier, Torlak, located in Belgrade, does have a stock available (since no one has yet purchased their stock and there is no diphtheria epidemic there, at this time). Prior to the sanctions, this company was a major

international pharmaceutical firm and frequent supplier to the international market.

UNICEF therefore proposes purchasing 12,000 vials of anti-serum (worth $144,000) from the Torlak company for shipment to the NIS countries. In order to maintain cold storage at all times, either one or two shipments would take place via Swiss Air from Belgrade (a specific notification of the flight would be provided to the Committee once the exact date is known). UNICEF will be transferring no funds to the supplier at this time. The funds will be held in a UNICEF controlled account from which no payment will be made until either the sanctions regime has been modified to permit payment or the Committee authorizes such payment.

4. It should be reiterated that this request responds to an urgent, life-threatening situation in the affected countries. Approval of the shipment of anti-serum is likely to lead to saving a large number of lives. As indicated in paragraph 1, some 50,000 people are expected to contract the disease of which some 2,500 to 5,000 will die - in other words, over 200 to over 400 per month.

Your kind assistance on this matter will be greatly appreciated. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can further facilitate action.

Karin Sham Poo
Acting Executive Director

ATTACHMENT I

SUPPLIERS THAT HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY UNICEF

Connaught Laboratories Ltd.
Ontario, Canada

Eisai Co. Ltd.
Tokyo, Japan

Pasteur Merieux
Lyon, France

Serum Institute of India
Pune, India

Korea Green Cross Corporation
Seoul, Korea

Dong Shin Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.
Seoul, Korea

Merck Sharp & Dohme
West Point, Pennsylvania

Biocine S.p.A.
Siena, Italy

Hoechst AG
Marburg, Germany

Swiss Serum & Vaccine Institute
Berne, Switzerland

Intervax
Ontario, Canada

Perum Bio Farma
(Pasteur Institute)
Bandung, Indonesia

The Chemo Sero Therapeutic
Research Institute
Kumamoto, Japan

Lederle Laboratories
Pearl River, New York

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ATTACHMENT II

The New York Times | TUESDAY NOVEMBER 29, 1994

U.N. Reports Shortage Of Diphtheria Vaccine

GENEVA, Nov. 28 (Reuter) — As many as 40,000 children and adults will contract diphtheria in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union this year because of a shortage of vaccine there, United Nations health specialists said today.

The specialists, from the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund, said the majority of cases were being reported from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.

But they said all the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe had reported recent cases.

The figure of 40,000 is double the number of cases reported last year and a tenfold increase over 1990.

Diphtheria, which usually attacks the tonsils or throat membranes and can cause potentially fatal damage to the heart and kidneys, was brought under control through immunization after World War II.

But problems with the production of vaccine in Russia and in neighboring independent states since the collapse of Soviet rule have caused diphtheria rates to soar.

A Unicef statement said that among the main reasons for the resurgence of the disease were low immunization rates of children, waning immunity among adults, misleading campaigns against vaccination and large population movements.

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ATTACHMENT III

TORLAK INSTITUTE

Sera, Vaccines, Diagnostics

Beograd - Serbia - Yugoslavia

John J. Gilmartin
Chief, Purchasing EPI
U N I C E F
Copenhagen, Denmark

13 December 1994

Dear Mr. Gilmartin,

With reference to our telephone conversation and your fax EPI/jjg/chi/94-00239 of 13 Dec. 94 we, unfortunately, confirm that we agree that the payment will be into a blocked account.

We appreciate very much your efforts and assistance in this work and hope that as soon as the sanctions will be lifted, Telak will become a supplier to UNICEF again.

Best regards.

Yours sincerely,

Prim.Dr Zdravko Jankovic

EPI GROUP
13. DEC. 1994
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13. DEC. 1994
FAX OPERATOR

Address : Vojvode Stepe St. 458 - Telephone: 3811/472-911 - Fax: 3811/469-345; 469-634

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S/1994/1419
14 December 1994

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, and in particular its resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992,

Taking note of the letter of the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia of 14 December 1994 (S/1994/1418) and the communication of the Acting Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund of 13 December 1994 annexed thereto in which the Council is informed of a major resurgence of diphtheria, and that the only available stocks of anti-serum to combat this serious condition are located in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),

Recognizing that the export of anti-serum from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) will require an exemption from the provisions of resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 and acting, in this respect, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides to permit, for a period of thirty days from the date of the adoption of this resolution, the export of 12,000 vials of diphtheria anti-serum from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

2. Decides further that any payments for such authorized shipments shall be made only into frozen accounts;

3. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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S/1994/1420
14 December 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION CONCERNING WESTERN SAHARA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In the report I submitted to the Security Council on 5 November 1994 (S/1994/1257) on progress made by the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in the process of identification and registration of potential voters, I stated that I would report further to the Council after the consultations I intended to hold during my visit to the Mission area in November.

2. In a statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/1994/67) following consideration of my report, the Council, inter alia, welcomed my decision to visit the region and expressed the hope that, on that occasion, I would be able to report significant progress towards the implementation of the settlement plan and the holding of the referendum.

II. CONSULTATIONS IN THE MISSION AREA

3. I visited the Mission area from 25 to 29 November 1994. I was accompanied throughout the visit by Mr. Erik Jensen, my Deputy Special Representative for Western Sahara. At Algiers, I was received by the State President, Mr. Liamine Zeroual. I also held meetings with Mr. Abdelkader Bensalah, President of the National Transition Council; Mr. Mokdad Sifi, Head of Government; Mr. Mohamed Salah Dembri, Minister for Foreign Affairs; the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations, Mr. Ramtane Lamamra; and other senior officials of the Algerian Government.

4. At all my meetings in Algiers, I stressed the urgency of reaching an early settlement and sought Algeria's continued cooperation. At every level, the Algerian authorities reassured me of their firm support for the activities of the United Nations in Western Sahara and reaffirmed their preparedness to provide all necessary assistance in my efforts. They stressed, in particular, the need for the parties to adhere strictly to the provisions of the settlement plan, which they considered essential for the credibility of the referendum.

5. At Smara refugee camp near Tindouf, which I visited on 27 November, I met with Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz, Secretary-General of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia El-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), Mr. Bachir Mustapha Sayed, Deputy Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO and its Coordinator with MINURSO, Mr. Bukhari Ahmed, the representative of the Frente POLISARIO in New York, and other senior POLISARIO officials. Issues discussed included the process leading to the referendum; the Security Council's position on this issue; increasing the number of identification centres and personnel; various other aspects of MINURSO's work; and the cooperation of both parties with my Deputy Special Representative. The POLISARIO leaders expressed concern about certain developments since the beginning of the identification and registration process that they viewed as impediments to the smooth implementation of the settlement plan and the conduct of a free, fair and impartial referendum.

6. They emphasized that, despite those impediments and the reservation they had about some of the criteria for eligibility to participate in the referendum, they had steadfastly maintained their cooperation with MINURSO and the Deputy Special Representative. They urged the United Nations to address the issues of concern in order to facilitate the implementation of the plan. They raised also the question of direct talks with the other party and, in this connection, reiterated their proposal for a conference in which, in addition to the parties, certain members of the Security Council and some other interested countries would participate. Such a conference would, in their view, provide a forum and an opportunity for the parties to engage in direct dialogue on outstanding matters, including the post-referendum period. Furthermore, the Frente POLISARIO leaders believed that that would be in line with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions that have consistently called for direct talks between the two parties in order to create an atmosphere conducive to the speedy and effective implementation of the settlement plan. They indicated, however, that, while they continued to believe that direct dialogue would be useful, they would not make it a prerequisite for the continuation of the peace process in conformity with the plan.

7. Addressing the Frente POLISARIO'S main concern - the large number of application forms submitted at the last minute - I pointed out that the Identification Commission was an independent body whose members, I was confident, would carry out their mandate with impartiality, fairness and integrity. I urged the Frente POLISARIO leaders to continue to cooperate with my Deputy Special Representative and MINURSO so as to facilitate rapid progress in the implementation of the plan. I made it clear, however, that, ultimately, the continued involvement of the United Nations would depend on the demonstrated political will of the parties.

8. While insisting that all necessary measures should be taken to guarantee the credibility of the referendum, Mr. Abdelaziz reiterated his full commitment to the settlement plan and pledged his continuing cooperation with MINURSO and my Deputy Special Representative. We both agreed that the beginning of identification and registration was a major step towards the full implementation of the plan and that our efforts in the months ahead should focus on the measures necessary to accelerate very significantly the pace of this process.

9. At Rabat, where I arrived after a visit to the headquarters of MINURSO at Laayoune, I was received by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco. I also held meetings with the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Abdelatif Filali; the Minister of the Interior and Information, Mr. Driss Basri; the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations, Mr. Ahmed Snoussi, and other senior officials of the Government of Morocco. At these meetings, a wide range of issues relating to the implementation of the settlement plan were discussed. These included the referendum; progress achieved so far in identification and registration and measures required to accelerate the pace of the process; the cooperation of both parties with MINURSO and my Deputy Special Representative; and the position and expectations of the Security Council regarding the process leading to the holding of the referendum.

10. I was reassured that Morocco remained fully committed to the settlement plan and would continue to provide all assistance required for my efforts to implement the plan. The Moroccan authorities further pledged continued support for the activities of MINURSO and the efforts of my Deputy Special Representative. They also considered that the beginning of the identification and registration process was a very important step despite the delays the process had experienced, and promised to cooperate actively with my Deputy Special Representative with a view to achieving its successful completion within a reasonable time-frame.

11. In my report to the Security Council of 5 November, I informed the Council of my intention to send a technical team to MINURSO to reassess the logistic and other requirements for the possible full deployment of the Mission at full strength. The team visited MINURSO from 10 to 14 November and worked closely with the Mission's staff in updating the military, logistic, civilian personnel and other requirements for the possible full deployment of the Mission. The technical team identified one of the major bottlenecks as being the lack of suitable accommodation throughout the Mission area for MINURSO personnel.

12. Given the work still to be completed in the identification of potential voters, the technical team found that it was as yet premature to make final arrangements with regard to the logistic and other resources required for the deployment of MINURSO at full strength. The team agreed that MINURSO should focus on finding means to speed up the process of identifying and registering potential voters and, in this connection, strongly supported the idea of expanding the Identification Commission.

III. OBSERVATIONS

13. The above account of my consultations with the parties indicates that, despite the difficulties encountered and the delays experienced over the past few months, the political will exists to move the process forward. Both parties recognize the major step that the beginning of the identification and registration process has marked. The identification and registration process is all the more important because, unless it is carried out in a thorough and consistent manner and to the reasonable satisfaction of the two parties in terms of its fairness and impartiality, any dispute that resulted would be likely to affect the implementation of the other aspects of the plan and could prejudice

the credibility of the referendum. It is therefore essential that all necessary measures be taken not only to accelerate the pace of the process but also to ensure that it is carried out in the appropriate manner.

14. My visit to the identification and registration centre near MINURSO headquarters in Laayoune has enabled me to see how complex and time-consuming the identification and registration process has to be in order to overcome objections, resolve doubts and deliver a convincing and credible outcome.

15. Further complicating matters in a territory of such vast size are the logiscical problems of ensuring the presence at all identification and registration centres of observers of both parties and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), as well as the tribal leaders who have a key role in identification and registration. The fact that in the refugee camps as well as in the territory itself members of the same tribal group are widely dispersed in several different places poses a further difficulty.

16. It is hoped that, with the promised cooperation of the parties and using MINURSO's own resources, all the data relating to the application forms will be available in computerized form by the end of this year. That and the experience gained to date by the identification and registration teams augurs well for the next stage of the process.

17. However, given the large number of applications now received, the only way to complete identification and registration in a reasonable time would be through a major reinforcement of personnel and other resources. My Deputy Special Representative has indicated that the four identification and registration teams working at Laayoune and Tindouf (two at each centre) have achieved a weekly output of 1,000 potential voters interviewed and identified and that the rate of output is steadily increasing. After his return to Laayoune, my Deputy Special Representative was able to reach final agreement with the Moroccan authorities on the opening of a new centre in Boujdour. Accordingly, identification began in Boujdour on 2 December and, on 5 December, a further centre near Tindouf became operational. It is estimated, however, that the completion of the work within a reasonable time-frame will require an estimated 25 teams working simultaneously at an increased number of identification and registration centres. As indicated in my previous report (S/1994/1257), consultations are already being held with the parties regarding the location, equipping and opening of additional centres.

18. MINURSO has developed a plan for the establishment of six additional centres (each to include two identification and registration teams) and five mobile identification and registration teams. Preliminary cost estimates for the further expansion of the Identification Commission are contained in a separate addendum to the present report.

19. Each identification centre consists of six Professionals, namely, three identification commission members (one of whom is the team leader), two Arabic-speaking registration officers and one systems analyst. The mobile identification teams consist of one identification commission member, one Arabic-speaking registration officer and one systems analyst. Thus, a total number of 51 additional Professional staff will be required to expand the

identification commission as recommended. The increase in the number of identification centres will require a commensurate increase in the number of administrative support staff both at the centres and at MINURSO headquarters. These Professionals will be assisted by a commensurate increase in the number of international and local General Service staff. Approximately 13 civilian police are required to provide security and assist with the identification activities at each centre, and 4 civilian police are required for each mobile team. As the present strength of the civilian police component is 55, an additional 105 civilian police will be required, including 10 officers at the civilian police headquarters.

20. The increase in the number of identification centres will also necessitate an increase in the number of observers from OAU, and I urge that organization to continue to make every effort to deploy the observers necessary to facilitate the identification process.

21. It is my hope that, by 31 March 1995, progress achieved in the identification and registration process will reach a level that will enable me to recommend 1 June 1995 as the date (D-day) for the start of the transitional period. As of 1 June 1995, in accordance with the settlement plan, the combatants of the two sides would be confined to designated locations and, as soon as possible after this date, prisoners-of-war would be exchanged, amnesties would be proclaimed for political prisoners and detainees and for returnees and all political prisoners or detainees would be released. Not later than mid-August 1995 (D + 11 weeks), the reduction of Moroccan forces present in the Territory would be completed and all laws or measures that could obstruct the conduct of a free and fair referendum would be suspended.

22. In mid-August, on the assumption that the Security Council had approved the expansion of MINURSO as proposed in paragraphs 17 to 19 above, the identification and registration of voters should be completed and the final list of voters published. The repatriation programme should be completed by the end of September (D + 17). The latter date would coincide with the start of the referendum campaign in time to permit the referendum to take place in October 1995 (D + 20). The draft code of conduct for the referendum campaign has already been completed and forwarded to the parties for their comments.

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19 December 1994

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PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION CONCERNING WESTERN SAHARA

Addendum

1. Pursuant to paragraph 18 of my report of 14 December 1994 (S/1994/1420), I wish to inform the Security Council that the estimated cost of the further expansion of the Identification Commission of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) for the period from 1 January to 15 August 1995 would be approximately $18.1 million. The staffing of the Mission would provide for an additional 105 civilian police monitors, 124 international staff, 35 locally recruited staff as well as 12 observers from the Organization of African Unity (OAU). A breakdown of the estimated cost by main categories of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

2. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council approve the expansion of MINURSO, that the additional costs relating thereto be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to the MINURSO special account.

Annex

Cost estimates for the expansion of the Identification Commission for the period from 1 January to 15 August 1995

(Thousands of United States dollars)

		Amount
1.	Military personnel costs	17.6
2.	Civilian personnel costs	9 836.0
3.	Premises/accommodation	572.3
4.	Infrastructure repairs	-
5.	Transport operations	2 572.3
6.	Air operations	928.3
7.	Naval operations	-
8.	Communications	1 442.1
9.	Other equipment	731.1
10.	Supplies and services	115.5
11.	Election-related supplies and services	-
12.	Public information programmes	-
13.	Training programmes	-
14.	Mine-clearing programmes	-
15.	Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	-
16.	Air and surface freight	10.0
17.	Integrated Management Information System	-
18.	Support account for peace-keeping operations	836.0
19.	Staff assessment	1 059.9
	Total	18 121.1

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15 December 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 13 DECEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a table showing the 860 miscellaneous bombs, rockets, mines and other ordnance, some of the remnants of the 30-Power aggression against Iraq, that were found and disposed of in all parts of Iraq in the period 1-30 November 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Monthly bomb-disposal statement, 1-30 November 1994

No.	Governorate	Human losses		Number and type of ordnance disposed of
		Dead	Injured	
1	Baghdad	3	-	1 shell 1 assault hand-grenade 41 detonators for shells of various calibre 1 anti-personnel mine 1 60-mm mortar shell
2	Najaf	-	-	1 American assault grenade
3	Karbala	-	-	1 heavy artillery shell 1 assault grenade
4	Wasit	-	-	15 Russian-made Katyusha rockets 1 locally made explosive charge
5	Maysan	3	1	1 Mk 85 bomb 6 cluster bombs 3 82-mm mortar shells
6	Dhi Qar	-	-	1 anti-personnel mine 2 Russian-made Strela missiles
7	Muthanna	-	-	24 tank shells 19 105-mm artillery shells 12 cluster bombs 1 defence mortar shell
8	Basra	-	-	15 120-mm artillery shells 13 60-mm mortar shells 17 82-mm mortar shells 25 120-mm mortar shells 62 anti-personnel mines 1 anti-tank mine 3 rockets 20 assault hand-grenades 14 defence hand-grenades 20 hand-grenade detonators 32 cluster bombs
9	Diyala	-	-	1 120-mm mortar shell 1 armour-piercing shell 1 artillery shell
10	Anbar	-	-	364 cluster bombs 70 spherical bombs
11	Ninawa	-	-	58 American-made spherical bombs 5 mortar shells 1 shell
12	Salah al-Din	3	5	2 artillery shells

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15 December 1994

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General, pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

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Annex

Eighth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), on the activities of the Special Commission

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is the eighth on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), submitted to the Security Council by the Executive Chairman of the Commission. It is the seventh such report provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991). It covers the period from 10 June to 9 December 1994, and is further to the reports contained in documents S/23165, S/23268, S/24108 and Corr.1, S/24984, S/25977, S/26910 and S/1994/750.

2. As noted in the report contained in document S/1994/1138 and Corr.1 submitted under Council resolution 715 (1991), during the six months to October 1994, the Commission allocated the bulk of its resources to the establishment of the ongoing monitoring and verification system. Since the time of that report, the Commission has been forced to redirect more of its total resources to resolving outstanding issues in relation to the past programmes and to the establishment of the export/import mechanism required under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991). Even so, a large part of the developments to be covered in the present report have already been addressed in the October report. Consequently, there is considerable overlap between the two reports.

II. DEVELOPMENTS

A. General

3. Much has been achieved in the period under review. The Commission has moved on from the initial stages of establishing the system of ongoing monitoring and verification to a stage where the system is provisionally operational and its efficacy is being tested. Interim monitoring in the biological area began in December 1994. In addition, the Commission has advanced its understanding of the past programmes and has pursued the establishment of an export/import mechanism for dual-purpose items as defined by the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. The political dialogue between the Commission and Iraq has continued; high-level meetings, both general and technical, were held in New York in July, September, October and November and in Baghdad in July, October and November 1994.

4. The emphasis of the Commission's efforts in this period was clearly to establish the ongoing monitoring and verification system. This required the collation and analysis of data about Iraq's dual-purpose capabilities, the

preparation of monitoring and verification protocols for each site to be monitored, the inventorying and tagging of identified dual-purpose items, the installation of sensors, the establishment of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre and communications with remote-controlled sensors, and the dispatch of resident monitoring groups to Iraq to serve in the Centre.

5. Concurrent with this major effort, the Commission followed through on the understanding reached with Iraq in October 1993 to resolve outstanding issues related to Iraq's past proscribed programmes in parallel with the establishment of ongoing monitoring and verification. In this regard, further discussions were held with Iraq, Iraqi personnel were interviewed, the Commission obtained some limited additional documentation from Iraq and further inspections were conducted. Furthermore, the Commission intensified greatly its contacts with supporting and supplier Governments as part of its efforts to corroborate, in the absence of direct supporting evidence from Iraq itself, Iraqi accounts of its imports for the past programmes. Analysis of the data available to the Commission from all these sources has indicated new avenues of investigation to pursue in order to obtain an independently verified account. In many instances, new information obtained by the Commission contradicted the accounts given by Iraq. Detailed, complete and accurate data on previous imports of prohibited and dual-purpose items is necessary to fulfil the mandate to account fully for Iraq's past proscribed capabilities and to ensure a comprehensive ongoing monitoring and verification system covering all of Iraq's dual-purpose capabilities.

6. Considerable effort was also expended on another aspect of the Commission's work, completion of which is a prerequisite for fulfilling the terms for the lifting of the sanctions - development of the concept and operational plan for the export/import mechanism required under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991). Further seminars were held with international experts to elaborate the items to be covered by the mechanism and to create a practical, effective and durable system.

7. Iraq was, during the period under report, generally cooperative in the Commission's efforts to establish the physical aspects of ongoing monitoring and verification. Access was provided to all sites designated by the Commission for inspection and to personnel involved. Iraq provided much support for the installation of monitoring sensors, for the inventorying and tagging of dual-purpose items, for the construction of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre and for the establishment of communications between the Centre and the remote-controlled sensors.

8. However, Iraq's attitude to the provision of data and supporting evidence still fell far short of its obligation to provide full, final and complete disclosures of its past proscribed programmes and of its current and recent dual-purpose capabilities subject to ongoing monitoring and verification. It appears that many of Iraq's declarations are incomplete and sometimes contradictory. The Commission has both direct and indirect evidence that Iraq is still failing to declare equipment and materials acquired for and capable of use in proscribed programmes and that its accounts of certain of its projects do not reflect their true purpose and their role as part of now proscribed weapons programmes. In general, in relation to the past programmes, Iraq has not

volunteered information and has shown marked lack of transparency, disclosing information only when confronted with evidence by the Commission. Iraq maintains its claim, not believed by the Commission, that it has destroyed all documentation related to these programmes and that no other tangible proofs exist to support its accounts. Indeed, events of the past six months have strengthened the Commission's conviction that important documentation still exists and that the Iraqi authorities have taken the conscious decision not to release it freely to the Commission. In any case, Iraq has not fulfilled its undertaking to resolve all outstanding issues in relation to the past programmes in parallel with the establishment of ongoing monitoring and verification. The importance of doing so has been repeatedly impressed upon Iraq at each of the high-level meetings referred to above, as has the need for Iraq to provide documentation and supporting evidence.

9. The situation is better in relation to declarations required under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. Generally, despite omissions and inconsistencies, these declarations have been sufficient to permit the initiation of ongoing monitoring and verification. However, early in the reporting period, major problems continued in the biological area, where incomplete declarations, the failure to declare all equipment and materials which should be monitored, together with a failure to declare movement, repair or modification of equipment between inspections, resulted in a situation where the establishment of reliable baseline data from which to start monitoring was not possible. This, clearly, delayed the initiation of ongoing monitoring and verification in the biological area. However, in November 1994, Iraq presented new declarations in the biological area and has undertaken to work with the Commission to continue to improve these declarations. As a result of these developments, interim monitoring in the biological area has now started.

10. Initially, a delaying factor was that managers and senior personnel at sites being monitored were not sufficiently aware of the nature of ongoing monitoring and verification and of the Commission's rights to conduct it. However, the situation appears to be improving significantly as Iraq gains greater experience in ongoing monitoring and verification and so understands the need to educate key personnel at monitored sites.

11. There have been fewer problems in the exercise of the Commission's privileges and immunities during the period under review, with fewer challenges as to whether the Commission's activities are indeed related to resolution 715 (1991) (i.e. covered by the mandate to conduct ongoing monitoring and verification), only a few minor attempts to restrict or delay access to sites or personnel, and limited instances of tampering with tags. Harassment of Commission personnel has all but stopped and, while minor problems arose in relation to the operation of the aerial inspections, there have been no attempts to prevent the Commission from taking the photographs it is instructed to obtain.

12. However, in the autumn, the Iraqi authorities created a serious crisis with regard to the implementation of resolution 687 (1991). On 22 September 1994, the Iraqi authorities started to make threats to block the work of the Commission. In an effort to normalize the situation, the Executive Chairman visited Baghdad early in October 1994. In meetings with the Foreign Minister of

Iraq and other officials on 4 and 5 October 1994, the Iraqi side rejected all appeals by the Chairman to withdraw those threats. At this time, Iraqi troop movements in the direction of Kuwait had already started.

13. On 6 October 1994, a joint meeting of Iraq's Revolution Command Council and the Iraqi Command of the Ba'ath Party indicated that, unless the Security Council's consideration of the Commission's biannual report on the implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification (S/1994/1138 and Corr.1) to take place on or about 10 October 1994 were favourable to Iraq, Iraq might withdraw its cooperation with the Commission. This was rejected by the Council on 8 October 1994 in a statement by its President on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1994/58). On 15 October, the Security Council adopted resolution 949 (1994), demanding "that Iraq cooperate fully with the Commission" and the withdrawal of "all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions".

14. Subsequently, it became clear that Iraq did not follow through on its threats and, throughout the events surrounding the troop movements of October 1994, the Commission was able to continue its operations as usual. These developments served to underline the need continuously to watch Iraq's intentions and actions closely in relation to the work of the Commission. Any change in Iraq's current attitude towards the Commission will be reported to the Council immediately.

B. Missiles

15. In the missile area, the Commission has a fuller account of Iraq's past programmes but the issue of verification remains. Areas of particular concern relate to accounting for known imports of components and production equipment. Efforts to address these concerns have focused on increased contacts with supporting and supplier Governments and further discussions with Iraq. However, on several occasions, Iraq has not declared the full facts when issues have first been raised. A prime example relates to the import of a high-precision instrumentation radar which the Commission has firm evidence was imported for proscribed ballistic missile programmes and was used as part of the testing of proscribed missiles. Iraq denied this outright and has presented numerous different and conflicting explanations of the use and purpose of this radar. On 14 December 1994, the Commission informed Iraq by letter of its decision that the radar must be destroyed, stating:

> "The Commission's investigations into and judgements on this matter have relied on information obtained from a variety of different sources and on your authorities' own statements. From Iraq's own declarations, the radar was used around the time of two Al Abbas missile launches on 28 December 1990. Iraq subsequently acknowledged that the radar was installed at the testing site in Basrah on 26 December 1990, that adjustment and initial operations began on 27 December 1990, that testing activity and adjustment continued on 28 December 1990, and that the radar was disassembled and packaged on 29 December 1990. Most recently, Iraq further acknowledged that the radar was operating and the radar dish was pointed in the direction of the missiles during the two test launches.

"The Commission has, on the basis of all the information available to it, concluded that the radar was indeed involved in the tracking of proscribed missile systems on 28 December 1990. Consequently, the radar is an item which is proscribed under paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The radar and associated equipment has therefore to be disposed of in accordance with that paragraph."

16. Ongoing monitoring and verification has proceeded well in this area. Monitoring and verification protocols have been completed for the sites to be monitored and all missiles, components and equipment identified for monitoring have been tagged and inventoried. Fifty monitoring cameras have been installed at 15 sites and the missile monitoring group is proceeding with monitoring activities. In general, Iraq's declarations for missile monitoring have been adequate, although there have been some omissions, such as failure to declare stored dual-purpose equipment. These shortcomings are being addressed in the course of monitoring activities.

C. Chemical weapons

17. Similar problems exist in the chemical area regarding past programmes. The list of letters of credit obtained from Iraq in April 1994, while neither accurate nor complete, has provided the Commission with much new data and new avenues for further investigations. However, the Commission cannot yet be certain that it has accounted fully for all the precursors and production equipment imported. These uncertainties, coupled with a lack of substantiation of the disposition of chemical munitions, renders a full material balance for the chemical weapons programmes impossible for the moment.

18. Ongoing monitoring and verification is also proceeding well in this area, although it is less advanced than in the missile area. Monitoring and verification protocols have been completed for all the key sites and the key items have been tagged and inventoried. A chemical monitoring group is in Iraq operating out of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. It is completing the protocol-building and tagging process at sites of secondary importance, such as universities, while conducting ongoing monitoring and verification of key sites. Four chemical sensors have been installed at one site and a further 20 should be installed at other sites in January 1995. Monitoring cameras and flow meters should be installed by the same date. A small chemical laboratory will be installed at the Centre in February 1995.

19. The Commission will experiment with a number of different configurations for the disposition of the chemical sensors, some being placed inside buildings and others outside, to assess the best combination of sensors, given the chemical processes and number of buildings involved and the prevailing wind conditions. These experiments should take about six to eight weeks to complete.

D. Biological weapons

20. The Commission faces its greatest problems in accounting for Iraq's past biological programme. Iraq's account is minimal and has no inherent logic.

While access has been provided to interview the personnel involved in the declared programme, interviewees refused to answer questions relating to the programme, providing only incomplete and misleading information. While Iraq maintains that the programme was in the early research stages and would be defensively oriented, the indications all point to an offensive programme. In these circumstances, the Commission cannot yet provide a material balance for this programme.

21. The Commission has also faced greater problems in seeking to establish ongoing monitoring and verification in the biological area than it did in the other areas. Iraq's declarations of dual-purpose items were, until recently, often largely incomplete, inconsistent with each other and with the findings of inspection teams, and not updated with notifications of movement of declared items from one site to another.

22. To redress this situation, the Commission requested that Iraq provide new and complete declarations for all the sites to be monitored and instructed Iraq on how these declarations should be formatted. New declarations were submitted in November 1994. Currently, Iraq is working with inspection teams in Iraq to improve these declarations. In addition, an interim monitoring group has been dispatched to Iraq to obtain for the key sites the information that Iraq should have declared and which is required to create monitoring and verification protocols for those sites. Thereafter, this group will monitor these key sites. However, as this procedure is time- and resource-intensive, it cannot be followed for each of the numerous biological sites to be monitored.

23. In the meantime, the Commission has identified, inventoried and tagged a large number of dual-purpose items which will need to be monitored. A second round of inventorying has been necessitated by Iraq's failure to declare all such equipment and to notify movement of it and because of damage to tags already installed. Plans are in hand to install monitoring cameras at a number of sites to monitor activity levels and to install a biological laboratory at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.

E. Aerial surveillance

24. Aerial surveillance, both by helicopter and by high-altitude aircraft, continues to be key to the efficacy of the Commission's overall ongoing monitoring and verification effort. Without these assets, the Commission's ability to identify undeclared facilities of potential interest for ongoing monitoring and verification would be greatly diminished. Furthermore, the efficiency with which the Commission could monitor the large number of declared sites would also be greatly reduced. It is worrying, in this regard, that Iraq still objects to each flight of the Commission's high-altitude surveillance aircraft.

25. The aerial inspection team continues to perform a valuable task of obtaining close-up photography of monitored sites. Furthermore, with the arrival of the monitoring groups resident in Iraq, joint aerial inspections, with inspectors from the aerial inspection team and the weapons experts from one or more monitoring group, are creating new synergy and efficiency in monitoring.

The contribution by the Government of Germany of three CH-53G helicopters, crew and maintenance staff is key to the performance of this and other essential tasks. It has been of the greatest importance in the implementation of the mandates of the Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), particularly in areas remote from Baghdad. The Commission's aerial assets are currently fully utilized and it is envisaged that monitoring efforts will increasingly rely on their use.

F. Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre

26. Work continues to complete the installation of the equipment for the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. Some installation work in the period under review had to be delayed and rescheduled because of the lack of funding. Recent assurances as to new financial contributions have permitted the resumption of the work involved, and it is hoped that the Centre will be fully equipped and staffed by the end of February 1995. Thereafter, only minor adjustments to its staffing would be envisaged in the light of experience until the addition of an export/import control group to supplement the monitoring groups.

G. Data handling

27. The Commission's activities generate a large amount of data. The Commission, with the help of a supporting Government, has developed and is continuing to develop software for a single relational database to allow easy and full analysis of the data obtained from all sources. In addition, another Government is helping with customizing a second, compatible database specifically for handling the export/import data. This system should be installed by the end of February 1995.

H. Export/import mechanism

28. The Commission has conducted further seminars with international experts to develop further the export/import mechanism. There appears to be general agreement in the Sanctions Committee on the underlying concept of the paper submitted to it by the Commission and IAEA in May 1994. The Commission hopes to reconvene its seminar of international experts in early January 1995 and so to be able to submit a final version of the concept paper to the Sanctions Committee towards the end of January 1995. It is envisaged that the paper would be forwarded to the Security Council for its consideration soon after. Revised annexes to the plans of the Commission and IAEA for ongoing monitoring and verification will also be brought to the Council's attention before they are implemented. These revised annexes will contain the comprehensive listing of items to be reported by exporting Governments under the mechanism.

III. ISSUES AND PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE

29. Iraq must provide credible accounts for all its past proscribed programmes and capabilities and supporting evidence to enable the Commission independently to verify its declarations so that the Commission can achieve a material balance for the past programmes and thereby have confidence that its ongoing monitoring and verification system is proceeding from a sound basis. Without such confidence, the Commission cannot be certain that it is indeed monitoring all the facilities and items in Iraq which should be monitored if the requirements of the Security Council are to be fulfilled. Furthermore, failure by Iraq to provide full and transparent accounting of its past programmes can only undermine confidence in its intentions and in the completeness of its declarations in this regard. The speed with which this issue can be resolved is primarily dependent on Iraq's openness and honesty, although supplier Governments can also play a significant role in responding to the Commission's requests for assistance in verifying Iraq's accounts of its imports. The absence of such responses can only delay the Commission's efforts to obtain a credible material balance for Iraq's past programmes. Certain supplier Governments have been very forthcoming and the Commission is pursuing its efforts with those which have still to reply.

30. Iraq should also provide complete data on all its current dual-purpose capabilities as defined in the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification contained in document S/22871/Rev.1. While, in the absence of full Iraqi declarations, the Commission could conduct intrusive inspections at all relevant facilities to uncover all such capabilities, this would be neither an efficient use of the Commission's resources nor the quickest means of implementing the terms of paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

31. Iraq has also yet to adopt the necessary legal and administrative measures to give effect to its obligations under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, although it is known to be working on the necessary legislation.

32. Efforts to establish an effective ongoing monitoring and verification system are well-advanced. The system is provisionally operational and testing of it has begun. With the installation of further elements of the system, the Commission will gain experience in operating and confidence in the efficacy of the system. By the end of February 1995, the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre should be fully staffed for its current operations.

33. An increasing share of the Commission's resources will in the future be devoted to the establishment and, upon the easing of the sanctions in accordance with paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), operation of the export/import mechanism. The export/import mechanism is a fundamental element in the overall ongoing monitoring and verification system. Without it, once Iraq is able to import dual-purpose items, the system could not be expected to be effective. It is essential that this mechanism be operational prior to the easing of sanctions to the extent that Iraq is able to import such items. The Commission is pressing to have all the legal and practical elements adopted as soon as possible.

34. A major concern facing the Commission at this stage is financing. Activities to equip the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre have already been delayed because of the lack of guaranteed funds to pay for the materials required. Furthermore, while the short-term financial crisis reported in October 1994 appears to have been addressed through the promise of funds from Kuwait and the United States of America, the Commission only has promises of funding until the end of March 1995. Insecure medium-term funding limits the Commission's ability to conduct long-term planning and hence will inevitably create inefficiencies. It may, in the worst case, adversely affect the effectiveness of the Commission's ongoing monitoring and verification regime or even endanger continuous operations. A long-term solution to the issue of the Commission's financing is necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the mandate contained in section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

IV. CONCLUSION

35. While the preceding paragraphs inevitably dwell on outstanding issues where further work remains, much progress has been made during the period under review towards the fulfilment of the Commission's mandate. All items verified as being proscribed have now been destroyed. The ongoing monitoring and verification system is provisionally operational. The major elements for chemical and missile monitoring are in place. Interim monitoring in the biological area is about to commence. Testing of the system has begun, and a mechanism for monitoring Iraq's trade in dual-purpose items (the export/import mechanism) has been elaborated and appears to meet with approval.

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Addendum

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council an addendum to the report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General, pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), issued as document S/1994/1422, annex.

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Annex

Addendum to the eighth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), on the activities of the Special Commission

Appendix I

A. Missiles

1. The Special Commission has continued its activities in the missile area under the mandate established by Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). During 1994, the Commission will have conducted 15 missile inspections, more than the combined number of inspections undertaken in 1992 and 1993.

2. In order to provide the Council with an assessment of Iraq's compliance with the obligations set out under section C of resolution 687 (1991), the Commission intensified its endeavours to resolve outstanding issues in respect of Iraq's past prohibited missile programmes. In parallel, major efforts have been exerted to establish ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's missile-related activities and dual-purpose capabilities. As a result of these efforts, the essential elements of the monitoring system were in place as from the middle of August 1994. The system has been declared provisionally operational and is currently undergoing testing for thoroughness, reliability and the integrated operation of the system's components.

1. Past programmes

(a) Information

3. Iraq is required, under the terms of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), to provide full, final and complete disclosures on all aspects of its proscribed programmes and to respond fully, completely and promptly to questions and requests from the Commission. As a result of inspections, lengthy discussions with Iraq's authorities and other bodies and detailed analysis, the Commission now possesses a much fuller and more accurate picture of Iraq's past prohibited missile programmes than that presented by Iraq in its official "full, final and comprehensive report" submitted in May 1992.

4. During the reporting period, the Commission has intensified its investigations into issues related to past proscribed missile programmes. Special emphasis has been placed on verification of information provided by Iraq concerning foreign acquisition of proscribed missiles, their components and related production capabilities. Validation of this, and other information provided by Iraq, has been energetically pursued by the Commission. Specific assistance to facilitate this process has been requested from a number of countries. While some Governments were unable or unwilling to confirm or deny

details of supplies of equipment or assistance given to Iraq prior to the imposition of sanctions, the Commission has received many positive responses. Some 14 different bilateral meetings have been held during the reporting period on this matter.

5. The resulting information obtained from Governments and the Commission's own intensive analysis has, in some cases, revealed contradictions or highlighted omissions in Iraq's declarations. This has necessitated new rounds of discussions with Iraq in order to establish the true facts. Major issues related to past programmes were discussed with Iraqi representatives during a round of high-level talks in September 1994. Several inspection teams addressed in detail relevant issues with Iraqi officials and experts. However, there continues to be a proclivity for Iraq to fail to volunteer information and to confirm specific information only when a preponderance of evidence is produced by the Commission. This inevitably undermines the confidence the Commission can have in the completeness of Iraq's declarations. Furthermore, in some instances repeated statements by Iraq that equipment was not procured for proscribed programmes have proved to be incorrect. Iraq's continued insistence that all documents related to its past proscribed activities have been destroyed has also proved to be incorrect.

6. Some explanations and clarifications from Iraq are, as a consequence, still pending. The major outstanding issues relating to past proscribed missile programmes include accounting for certain missile components; identification of all equipment and items procured for, or used in, proscribed activities; and full disclosure of foreign assistance received by Iraq from a number of countries. The resolution of these and other remaining issues would be greatly expedited if Iraq provided documentation or other supporting evidence which would allow independent verification. The Commission has repeatedly called upon Iraq to adopt an attitude of full openness and cooperation on matters relating to its past programmes consistent with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions.

(b) Inspection activities

BM25/UNSCOM 81

7. BM25/UNSCOM 81 was in Iraq from 14 to 22 June 1994. The objectives of this team were twofold. First, to discuss unresolved issues related to past prohibited activities in Iraq, including missile production, modification projects and foreign supplies. Secondly, to elaborate, to Iraq's experts, definitions of the dual-purpose items and technologies contained in annex IV to the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.

8. As a special task, related to verification of Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 (1991), the team was requested to continue investigation into the alleged use of a high precision tracking radar to support launches of prohibited missiles in December 1990. Iraq's officials strongly denied that the radar had been used during those tests, or that it had been procured to support activities related to prohibited missiles. These denials contradicted information available to the Commission which indicated that the radar had been used in proscribed activities.

9. The Commission recently informed Iraq that, unless specific evidence were provided to prove clearly that the radar was not used in support of proscribed activities, the Commission, in accordance with its mandate to destroy or render harmless items prohibited under resolution 687 (1991), would proceed with the destruction of the radar. In response, Iraq has now acknowledged that the radar was intended to be used in both proscribed and non-proscribed activities. At the time of the writing of this report, discussions on this matter were continuing.

BM28/UNSCOM 98

10. The mission of BM28/UNSCOM 98 was to begin the process of compiling, in a single document, a coherent and detailed description of past proscribed missile programmes based on Iraq's statements and declarations. This mission was necessitated by the fragmentary nature of Iraq's declarations concerning its past missile programmes. It is using information obtained by the Commission from its own inspection activities and other sources. The effort was initiated by the Commission to assist Iraq in clarifying its reporting on past activities. It does not relieve Iraq of its obligations to provide to the Commission a full, final and complete accounting of its proscribed programmes as required by relevant Security Council resolutions.

11. BM28/UNSCOM 98 visited Iraq from 2 to 6 October and from 23 to 28 October 1994 to present to Iraq's experts the Commission's draft papers on past programmes. During its visits, the team reviewed these drafts with Iraq's authorities and interviewed a number of persons responsible for relevant activities. A follow-up team, BM30/UNSCOM 102, in Iraq from 9 to 16 December 1994, is continuing this effort.

12. This task will continue until the past programmes are clearly understood and properly documented. The Commission will evaluate all data obtained from Iraq with information obtained from a number of other sources in order to gain confidence, through analysis, in the completeness of Iraq's declarations.

2. Ongoing monitoring and verification

(a) Inspection activities

13. The current monitoring programme in the missile area constitutes a multi-layered system to accomplish the tasks of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in an efficient and practical manner. It covers, inter alia:

(a) A variety of sites and facilities currently engaged in missile activities or having relevant capabilities. At this moment, more than 30 facilities are being monitored;

(b) Activities crucial to reacquiring prohibited missiles. The focal points for monitoring include missile propellant mixers/extruders, equipment for liquid engine production and gyroscope balancing, missile/warhead assembly lines, a wind tunnel and static test stands. Special modes of monitoring, i.e., camera systems, were established to monitor these activities. The cameras'

recordings are analysed to extract information relevant for monitoring objectives;

(c) Specialized and dual-purpose equipment. Appropriate inventory control was established to monitor these items. For example, nearly 200 items have been tagged by the Commission. Many more are covered by facility protocols. Iraq's use of this equipment is checked by monitoring teams;

(d) Operational missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres. More than 1,300 missiles have been tagged by the Commission and are regularly checked for non-modification. In some instances, subsystems or components have been separately tagged.

BM26/UNSCOM 82

14. The Commission decided to use cameras and other sensors to increase the effectiveness of monitoring activities at a number of missile-related facilities. The task of BM26/UNSCOM 82 was to install the monitoring camera systems. The team operated in Iraq from 3 to 28 July 1994, and installed some 50 cameras with associated equipment at 15 sites being monitored. The team also placed tags and inventory labels on equipment identified for monitoring.

15. After a period of initial operation of the camera systems, a special sensor testing team was dispatched to Iraq from 8 to 16 August 1994. The team's mission was to validate the operational capabilities of the camera monitoring systems (through tests of sensor and communication technologies), operation and maintenance procedures, and processing modalities. The team provided recommendations for improved use of sensor monitoring systems in the missile area.

16. The product from the missile monitoring cameras is reviewed in three stages. First, each site is called up on a daily basis to check that the link is working. Secondly, the tape is reviewed by the resident missile monitoring team. Thirdly, the tape is dispatched for detailed expert analysis. The tapes are retained by the Commission for future comparative work.

BM27/UNSCOM 85

17. This team was in Iraq from 15 to 24 July 1994 with the primary mission of collecting updated information on and, by extension, updating the Commission's assessments of missile research and development activities in Iraq. Such updates are based on Iraq's declarations, special reports by Iraq and data collected by inspection teams. They are undertaken by the Commission on a biannual basis. BM27/UNSCOM 85 was the second team to perform such a task.

18. Extensive discussions were held with Iraqi officials and missile experts to obtain information relevant to the team's mission. Iraq submitted a detailed report on current missile programmes relevant to surface-to-surface missiles with a range greater than 50 kilometres. The team reaffirmed limitations established by the Commission on some missile design features so as to preclude any development of missiles capable of exceeding a range of 150 kilometres.

19. BM27/UNSCOM 85 also continued investigations into a number of issues related to research and development activities carried out by Iraq relating to past proscribed missile programmes.

Missile monitoring group 1

20. Upon completion of the baseline process in the missile area, in August 1994 the Commission dispatched the first missile monitoring group of resident inspectors to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. Such groups now operate continuously from the Centre and are a core element in the ongoing monitoring and verification system in Iraq. Monitoring groups have to perform a variety of missions, including:

(a) Execution of monitoring inspections on a regular basis at all missile-related sites being monitored;

(b) Checks of the tagged operational missiles;

(c) Initial assessment and verification of Iraq's declarations and reports;

(d) Maintaining a current inventory of items being monitored;

(e) Initial screening of the output of the sensor monitoring system;

(f) Specific short-notice tasks as directed by the Commission.

21. The first monitoring group (MG1) arrived in Iraq on 17 August and completed its mission on 9 October 1994. The group was composed of four experts specializing in various areas of missile development and production. During the mission, the group carried out 48 inspections of sites on a no-notice or short-notice basis. The group provided detailed reports on the progress of permitted missile programmes in Iraq and Iraq's current use of its dual-purpose capabilities.

Missile monitoring group 2

22. The second monitoring group (MG2) entered Iraq on 14 October 1994, and is scheduled to maintain the continuous missile monitoring presence until early February 1995. The personnel on the team will be rotated at staggered times to ensure that an experienced cadre of personnel remain in Iraq during the turnover to the next monitoring team in February. As at 8 December 1994, the second monitoring group had conducted 60 visits to facilities being monitored.

Missile monitoring groups 2A and 2B

23. Special groups (MG2A and MG2B) were sent to Iraq to supplement the expertise of monitoring group 2 to verify the non-modification of operational missiles covered by the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, which were originally tagged by UNSCOM 80 in June 1994. Monitoring group 2A was in Iraq from 19 to 22 October 1994 and monitoring group 2B carried out its mission from 2 to 6 December 1994. Iraq brought forward all the missiles requested for

verification by the Commission. The teams verified all tags and compared the operational missiles with technical reference material to ensure that Iraq had performed no modifications to increase the range of those missiles.

(b) Ongoing monitoring and verification declarations

24. In general, declarations in respect of ongoing monitoring and verification have been adequate in the missile area over the reporting period, most anomalies having been detected and corrected during the earlier baseline inspections. Nevertheless, omissions continue to be discovered, but it is anticipated that these will be corrected during the current phase of monitoring.

B. Chemical weapons

25. Since the last report on its activities the Commission has pursued in tandem the development of chemical monitoring and its implementation. At the same time, clarification of outstanding aspects of the past chemical weapons programmes continues to be a major concern.

1. Past programmes

(a) Information

26. Full knowledge and accounting of Iraq's past programmes is the key to ensuring that proscribed programmes have been eliminated and to confirming that the monitoring regime encompasses all equipment, technology and material in Iraq with potential for use for chemical weapons purposes.

27. The Commission has continued its efforts to fill gaps in Iraq's declarations on its past chemical weapons programmes, particularly those relating to suppliers and quantities of items and materials imported. In addition, strenuous attempts have been made to find ways to verify independently Iraq's accounting of the past programmes. During the reporting period, some 10 bilateral discussions with supporting Governments have taken place and a considerable amount of data on Iraq's imports has been obtained by the Commission.

28. The Commission considered that a major breakthrough had been achieved in verifying Iraq's declaration on imports of proscribed materials as a result of the CW15/UNSCOM 74 inspection in April 1994. That team was sent to Iraq specifically to address the issue of verification of past imports. During the inspection, the team was given a list of letters of credit which the Iraqi side claimed to cover all items imported in support of the chemical weapons programmes. The Commission energetically pursued this issue with the Governments of the suppliers concerned in order to verify the quantities supplied and the dates of supply. However, as a result of detailed analysis of the list of letters of credit and of the information from supporting Governments, the Commission has concluded that the list is not complete and contains errors. The consequence of the inconsistencies is that uncertainties remain, inter alia, about the amount of chemical agent produced, the amount of

precursors imported and consumed, and the amount of production equipment imported. The Commission is actively endeavouring to resolve these inconsistencies and uncertainties with Iraq and supplier Governments.

(b) Inspection activities

CW21/UNSCOM 95

29. CW21/UNSCOM 95 was sent to Iraq from 23 to 27 October 1994 to address anomalies in the list of letters of credit and outstanding information from Iraq on its past programmes. It also sought to collect such data as it could in order to improve the Commission's understanding of the past chemical weapons programmes.

30. During initial discussions, Iraq maintained that the list of letters of credit was complete. However, the team cited general examples of areas of omissions in Iraq's declarations. The incomplete nature of the list was further underlined during interviews with persons associated with the past programmes who referred to imported items of equipment not included in declarations.

31. In the course of the discussions and questioning, the team collected sufficient information and evidence to conclude that Iraq's previous declarations contained significant inconsistencies concerning purchases of precursor chemicals and equipment, equipment utilization and supplier companies. Iraq admitted that the list of letters of credit was not 100 per cent complete, but claimed that it was 90 to 95 per cent complete. The resultant uncertainties, together with other information available to the Commission, potentially translate into several hundred tons of unaccounted-for chemical warfare agents.

32. Iraq has therefore been asked to supply a new full, final and complete declaration, with supporting evidence for its past programmes. Once this has been received, the Commission will undertake a further verification exercise. In order to clarify inconsistencies in Iraq's declarations referring to chemical weapons-related munitions, an inspection will take place in January to address this particular issue.

2. Ongoing monitoring and verification

33. Monitoring in the chemical area has been addressed in four interrelated ways. The first is through the Commission's continued investigations into past Iraqi chemical weapons programmes. A complete understanding of Iraq's technical capabilities, manufacturing equipment, precursor suppliers and past chemical weapon production activities are essential if the Commission is to be confident that it is monitoring from a solid base. Secondly, the Commission conducted a site sweep and hand-over of the Muthanna State Establishment which is now being monitored. This facility was the hub of Iraq's past chemical weapons programmes, and contained the bulk of the declared and discovered chemical agent, filled munitions, and munition case production and filling equipment. The site survey and hand-over teams established that the site was free of prohibited materials and that all dual-use equipment at the site had been

destroyed or properly tagged and recorded. Thirdly, protocol-building missions were conducted at a variety of chemical sites. Finally, the chemical monitoring group was established in Iraq as part of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre and commenced monitoring activities.

(a) Inspection activities

CW19/UNSCOM 89

34. The second chemical protocol-building team operated in Iraq from 10 to 23 August 1994. Its task was to build protocols for 22 chemical facilities associated with the oil and petrochemical industry. These sites are of relevance to the monitoring regime because of the potential presence of either equipment or raw chemicals which could be used in the production of chemical warfare agents, or equipment which could be used to store such chemicals.

35. The team verified declared equipment and activities at the sites declared for monitoring. It also collected the information required for the building of protocols for each of the sites.

CW20/UNSCOM 91

36. This team conducted its activities in Iraq from 13 to 24 September 1994. Its principal task was to conduct protocol-building inspections at 12 sites associated primarily with Iraq's chemical fertilizer industry. The inspections were undertaken in order to identify possible dual-purpose equipment, facility or equipment redundancies, plant capacity and normal utilization, unusual chemical processes, and waste disposal methods and to resolve anomalies in Iraq's declarations concerning the sites. In the course of the inspection, the team was able to obtain the information required to build protocols.

Chemical monitoring group 1

37. The first chemical monitoring group (CG1), comprising four chemical experts, arrived in Iraq on 2 October 1994. As the first monitoring team in the chemical area, it is refining the chemical monitoring process and the information requirements for facility protocols and baseline inspections.

38. Under the guidance of the Commission in New York, the chemical group undertakes the following tasks:

(a) Revision of site protocols;

(b) Tagging and monitoring of dual-use chemical processing equipment;

(c) Conducting inspections of newly declared and undeclared sites of potential relevance to the chemical monitoring regime;

(d) Collection, assessments and recording of monitoring sensor data;

(e) No-notice tasks as directed by the Commission.

39. In addition to conducting inspections at sites for which monitoring and verification protocols have been prepared, the monitoring group will visit various chemical-related organizations to assess their relevance to ongoing monitoring and verification.

40. The team also investigates outstanding anomalies in Iraq's declarations concerning its current dual-purpose capabilities. Minor adjustments have been made by the Commission to the formats under which Iraq reports such capabilities in order to facilitate both the collection of data by Iraq and its analysis by the Commission. The team explains these changes to its Iraqi counterparts and provides further clarifications, as necessary, to enable Iraq to provide full and consistent declarations.

41. In support of future ongoing monitoring and verification in the chemical area, the Commission intends to install further sensors. A team is currently in the country preparing for the installation in January of an additional 20 air-sampling devices at four additional chemical production facilities of particular importance to the monitoring regime. In addition, it is planned to install flow meters at key points in the production equipment at at least one site. Several sites will be monitored by remote-controlled cameras.

42. Analysis of the samples taken by air samplers is currently being conducted in laboratories outside Iraq. However, when the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre has been completely equipped, it is intended that analysis of the samples will be undertaken at the chemical laboratory in the Centre. Only those samples which deviate from the normal background levels will be sent to approved international laboratories in order to obtain a cross-checking result from an independent source. From time to time, calibrating exercises will be undertaken to ensure the accuracy of analysis at the various laboratories. The presence of this analytical equipment will also enable other analytical questions to be dealt with at the Centre.

(b) Ongoing monitoring and verification declarations

43. Information provided by Iraq in respect of ongoing monitoring and verification in the chemical field has generally been reasonably accurate. Thus far no major inconsistencies have been encountered during the reporting period.

C. Biological weapons

1. Past programmes

44. Iraq has declared having undertaken biological research for military purposes at the Salman Pak site operated by Iraq's Technical Research Centre. During the first biological inspection in 1991, Iraq stated that the research could be used for defensive or offensive purposes, and concentrated on three agents, namely, Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxin) and Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene).

45. Owing to the lack of supporting data, verification of Iraq's accounting for the storage and disposal of equipment, storage of organisms, personnel,

relationships between the declared biological weapon research site and other organizations, and the acquisition of biotechnology has proved difficult. An accurate and verified account of these is essential if the Commission is to be certain that it is indeed monitoring the full extent of Iraq's dual-purpose biological capabilities. Furthermore, it will enable the Commission to focus its main monitoring efforts on key sites. The Commission has therefore continued to investigate past programme-related activities. Given the claimed destruction of all documentation related to the programme, verification of Iraq's account has, as in other areas, had to rely in large measure on interviews with personnel directly involved in the programme and indirect means of substantiation.

BW15/UNSCOM 104

46. BW15/UNSCOM 104 took place from 15 to 22 November 1994. Its prime activity was the interviewing of Iraqi officials who may have been associated with the past programme, in order to clarify the following points:

(a) Links between the Salman Pak site and other organizations;

(b The logic of the programme, including doctrine, practice, priorities, achievements, acquisition of biotechnology and know-how, protection and medical aspects, storage and rationale for location of the programme;

(c) A material balance for equipment, cell stocks and complex media acquired by Salman Pak or the programme;

(d) The real extent and intentions of the programme.

47. During the inspection, the team held discussions with 28 persons, many of whom had never been in contact with the Commission's experts before, including 9 of the 10 employees at Salman Pak. Access to personnel, whose identity had not previously been disclosed, therefore, constituted a major step forward. While the Commission remains unconvinced that Iraq's account of its past programme is either complete or accurate, this team did obtain new information, the significance of which requires further examination.

48. UNSCOM 104 continued the discussions with Iraq initiated during UNSCOM 96 on various direct and indirect means to substantiate Iraq's accounts in the absence of supporting documents or proof. Iraq agreed to try to provide such substantiation shortly after UNSCOM 104 left the country. In addition, various outstanding questions related to ongoing monitoring and verification declarations were addressed. Revised declarations were submitted, as requested by UNSCOM 96, and were further revised in the light of the team's comments.

2. Ongoing monitoring and verification

49. In preparation for the monitoring of Iraq's biological activities, the Commission has proceeded with the evaluation of the sites or facilities concerned by assessing the various elements which constitute Iraq's capability.

BW7/UNSCOM 86

50. Biological technical talks (BW7/UNSCOM 86) were held in Baghdad from 5 to 8 June 1994. The purpose was to try to clarify inconsistencies and anomalies between declarations concerning biological issues submitted by Iraq in January and April 1994 and the findings of BW4/UNSCOM 72, which visited many of the sites covered by their declarations for the first time.

51. During those talks, Iraq agreed to provide declarations and supplementary information regarding 24 sites. With respect to declarations, discussions focused on universities, breweries, facilities indigenously producing or modifying declarable equipment and import facilities. It was reiterated to Iraq that it was required to provide declarations for all dual-purpose capabilities covering the period from January 1986 to February 1994, including any facility related in any way to biological weapons activities. The form for 30-day prior notification of movement or modification of dual-use equipment, discussed during an earlier inspection, was provided to the Iraqi side. No such notification has yet been received by the Commission.

BW6/UNSCOM 84

52. BW6/UNSCOM 84 was in Iraq from 25 June to 5 July 1994. Its task was to survey 35 biological sites, some of which had not been declared by Iraq, in order to assess whether they should be monitored. Several sites were selected to test the practicality of the concept of the draft biological protocol. The sites chosen had been visited previously and covered four different activity areas, namely vaccine production, supplier company, research and development laboratory and single-cell production facility.

53. Eight of the undeclared sites were determined by the team to require monitoring as dual-purpose equipment was present or because of the nature of the activities conducted.

54. The team provided Iraq with a format for the provision of additional information required to complete the protocols and reiterated previous unfulfilled requests for information.

BW8/UNSCOM 87

55. BW8/UNSCOM 87 was in Iraq from 25 July to 7 September 1994 to create protocols for 55 sites which had been identified for monitoring.

56. However, the team observed inconsistencies and anomalies between its findings and those of previous inspection teams and the information contained in Iraq's various declarations. These related largely to equipment which had either been moved to the sites since the previous inspection or not been previously declared as being at those sites. Information on personnel, previously absent from declarations, was obtained during this inspection. None the less, queries concerning personnel present at sites, relationships between sites, and relationships to the past military biological programme were not fully clarified. During the course of the inspection, Iraq declared to the team

the names of further sites at which biological equipment or activities were present, and the team inspected those sites.

Technical talks held in New York in July

57. Technical talks held in New York during July 1994 concentrated upon the full provision of information requested during BW7/UNSCOM 86 and which remained outstanding, such as documentation concerning the import of biological materials by import company and information on relevant university activities.

BW9/UNSCOM 88

58. The team was in Iraq from 20 to 25 August 1994 and visited five biological facilities. Its objectives were to perform a feasibility study of remote monitoring in the biological area and, for the sites where this was deemed feasible, to establish the scope, foundations and requirements for the installation of remote monitors at biological sites. It concluded that, at those sites, remote monitoring equipment could constitute an effective means of supplementary on-site inspections.

BW10/UNSCOM 92

59. The team was in Iraq from 29 August to 3 September 1994. Its objectives were to complete the protocol-building process at certain sites and to inspect additional sites in order to assess whether they should be monitored.

60. The team visited a total of seven sites. On the basis of its results, two further sites were deemed as requiring monitoring.

BW11/UNSCOM 94

61. BW11/UNSCOM 94 was in Iraq from 29 September to 14 October 1994. Its main objective was to continue the inventorying and tagging of dual-use biological equipment started in May 1994 with BW5/UNSCOM 78 in order to address the anomalies in the equipment inventories observed during BW8/UNSCOM 87. UNSCOM 94 also determined the reasons for damage to or loss of tags noted during past inspections.

Technical talks held in New York in September

62. The discussions held in New York in September were in preparation for BW12/UNSCOM 96. They covered activities since 1986, monitoring, and Iraq's biological capability. The Commission presented the various steps taken so far in preparation for monitoring, and the difficulties encountered in certain areas in gathering the information required, especially in the field of research. It was agreed that a list of additional information required would be discussed and provided during BW12/UNSCOM 96.

BW12/UNSCOM 96

63. BW12/UNSCOM 96 held discussions with Iraqi officials at the National Monitoring Directorate from 23 to 26 September 1994. The main topics of

discussion were discrepancies between inspection findings and declarations; the difficulties encountered in reconciling information from both sources; declarations or additional sites previously requested; movement or modification of equipment; indigenous production of fermenters; import activities; the relationship between various biological sites; storage of equipment; work with certain micro-organisms; damaged or lost tags; management structure at the sites; future biological activities; declarations for activities conducted between January 1986 and February 1994; and past biological weapons work.

64. During the discussions, the scope of the monitoring effort and of the reporting requirements under the plan was reiterated, and the link between past activities and ongoing monitoring and verification outlined. Throughout the discussions, examples of indirect means of substantiation were explored as an alternative to the provision of supporting documentation, given Iraq's claim to have destroyed all relevant documentation. The need for the site managers to be familiarized with their reporting obligations was also addressed.

BW13/UNSCOM 99

65. BW13/UNSCOM 99 started its activity in Iraq on 2 December 1994. Its main purpose is to continue the inventorying of research, development and production equipment recently declared by Iraq.

BW16/UNSCOM 105

66. This inspection, which started on 2 December 1994, initiated interim monitoring of a key production site. The interim monitoring will, in the first instance, undertake an in-depth analysis of the activities of the site in order to redress the inadequacy of and inconsistencies in Iraq's previous declarations concerning this site.

67. By actively pursuing the data through interim monitoring, the Commission is relying less on Iraq's openness and more on inspection findings to obtain the baseline information for this site. However, this is a very time-consuming process and so can only be performed for a limited number of sites. The interim monitoring process does not remove the requirement for Iraq to declare accurately all its relevant dual-purpose biological activities.

D. Nuclear

68. The Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is reporting separately on the activities of the action team set up to implement paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991).

69. The Commission continues, in accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (iii) of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 715 (1991), to assist and cooperate with the IAEA action team through the provision of special expertise and logistical, informational and other operational support for the carrying out of the IAEA plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. In accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 715 (1991), it continues to designate sites for inspection. In

accordance with paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 707 (1991), it continues to receive and decide on requests from Iraq to move or destroy any material or equipment relating to its nuclear weapons programme or other nuclear activities. Furthermore, it continues, in accordance with paragraph 4 (c) of resolution 715 (1991), to perform such other functions, in cooperation in the nuclear field with the Director-General of IAEA, as may be necessary to coordinate activities under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, including making use of commonly available services and information to the fullest possible extent, in order to achieve maximum efficiency and optimum use of resources.

Gamma survey

70. A presentation on the final results of the gamma surveys undertaken in September and December 1993 was made to the Commission on 22 September 1994. The capability of the helicopter-borne detection system has been discussed not only as a means of detecting previously undeclared sites for designation by the Commission but also in respect of its future use as a major tool in the ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq.

71. The results of the gamma missions have shown the ability of the system to provide the Commission and IAEA with the capability to conduct survey missions for detection of certain nuclear activities through the detection of trace radioactive materials over designated sites and to execute current monitoring missions over declared sites. The system is also useful in mapping the level and isotope distribution of radioactive sources over a significant surface area. Use of the gamma mapping in association with the current environmental sampling being undertaken by IAEA could improve detection capabilities significantly and strengthen the overall monitoring system.

72. For some sites the results of the gamma mission have shown unidentified radioactive emissions from unidentified sources which will be investigated during future inspections.

Status of nuclear fuel removal

73. In the period under review, the reprocessing of the irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies removed from Iraq under the contract between IAEA and CIR Minatom has been completed at the Mayak facility in the Russian Federation. The uranium oxide resulting from the reprocessing is being moved to the Elektrostahl facility, also in the Russian Federation, where it will be placed under IAEA safeguards. Vitrification of the waste resulting from the reprocessing is also near completion. In Vienna, at the beginning of December, preliminary discussions were held between the IAEA action team and CIR Minatom regarding procedures for the sale of the reprocessed uranium oxide. As operations under the fuel removal and reprocessing contract are nearly complete, the final payments due from the United Nations under contract in the amount of some US$ 3,900,000 will have to be made early in 1995. This will constitute a further drain on the funds available to the Commission and IAEA in the carrying out of their mandates.

E. Aerial surveillance

74. The aerial inspection team continues to undertake aerial inspections at sites being monitored and at new facilities considered to be of possible relevance to the Commission's mandate. Where required, the team also provides support to ground inspections. All aerial inspections continue to be conducted on a no-notice basis, utilizing the Commission's three CH-53G helicopters. To date over 500 aerial inspections have been undertaken by the team.

75. In response to the evolving requirements of ongoing monitoring and verification, the aerial inspection team has made a number of changes to its method of operations. As the expert monitoring groups have become established at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre, members of those groups are accompanying the aerial inspection team on relevant aerial missions. This allows the experts to advise the aerial inspectors to focus on particular areas or activities of importance at the facilities.

76. It is planned to move the aerial inspection team's film development laboratory from its present location in the Commission's Bahrain field office to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. The team's photographic library will also move. This contains copies of all imagery and reports prepared by the team since the commencement of aerial inspections in June 1992. Immediate access to this historical imagery will enhance the aerial and ground teams' operations by allowing them to study sites in advance of inspections and thus readily to detect any external changes which have taken place at a facility since the previous inspection. Additional equipment has also been procured for the team to assist in refining and improving the product from the aerial inspections.

77. The Commission's high altitude surveillance aircraft, the U-2, continues to undertake an average of one to two flights a week. As at 6 December 1994, 229 missions have been flown. The imagery obtained from these missions is crucial to the Commission's operational planning.

Appendix II

A. Export/import monitoring mechanism

1. During the period covered by the present report* progress has been made towards the presentation to the Security Council of a proposal for a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions once the sanctions on those items have been lifted. Paragraph 7 of Council resolution 715 (1991) requires such a mechanism to be developed in cooperation between the Security Council Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) (the Sanctions Committee), the Special Commission and the Director-General of IAEA.

2. A concept paper for the mechanism, prepared by the Commission and IAEA, has been submitted to the Sanctions Committee. Informal discussions in that Committee appeared to reveal that a consensus could be reached on the proposal in the paper, once the Sanctions Committee had before it a more detailed list of items to be reported under the mechanism by exporting Governments and Iraq than was available in the annexes to the Commission's and IAEA's plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.

3. Accordingly, revisions to the annexes in the chemical, biological and missile areas were prepared, and these were submitted, together with the previously revised annex in the nuclear area (S/24300), to an informal meeting of international experts, held in New York on 18 and 19 October 1994, in order to determine the adequacy of the revisions for purposes of implementing an export reporting procedure. While the lists were in large measure approved, proposals were made for some further changes. These changes have now been made and the lists circulated to the participants in the meeting for comments, most of which have been received. It is intended to reconvene the informal meeting at the end of the first week of January 1995, to receive the final drafts of the lists, to consider the draft reporting forms to be submitted by Governments pursuant to the mechanism, and to discuss the practical implementation of the mechanism. Immediately after that meeting, it is hoped to be able to resubmit to the Sanctions Committee the concept paper, with the draft revised annexes to the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. When the concurrence of the Sanctions Committee is obtained in the course of January 1995, the proposal for the mechanism will be put before the Security Council for approval in a resolution to be adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. The revisions to the annexes to the plans will also be brought to the attention of the Council, in accordance with the procedures for revision of the annexes already approved by the Council and contained in the Commission's and IAEA's plans for ongoing

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* For developments up to mid-June 1994, see S/1994/750, paragraphs 26 to 28. For developments from mid-June to the beginning of October 1994, see S/1994/1138, paragraphs 26 to 31.

monitoring and verification (S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22871/Rev.2 and Corr.1, paras. 26 and 41).

B. Resource implications

4. The number of personnel and material resources required to support the export/import mechanism derives from the volume of data which the mechanism will generate. This figure, in turn, is derived from the volume of dual-use items which will be imported by Iraq. The Commission is currently engaged in analytical studies to acquire broad outline figures for the likely level of reportable items.

5. Dual-use items imported into Iraq before the imposition of sanctions should have been either destroyed or consumed, or should be currently subjected to the monitoring regime. In the missile, chemical, biological and nuclear fields, the numbers of items of dual-use equipment destroyed under United Nations supervision or currently being monitored ranges from 500 to 1,000 separate pieces. Assuming that these items were imported during a period of approximately two to five years, the number of shipments of dual-use items could be expected not to exceed 2,000 during a normal year. Assessments of export patterns from Western countries into countries similar to Iraq confirm these figures. Further analysis and refinement of the figures will take place over the coming months as further data becomes available.

6. Notwithstanding the absence of precise figures relating to the volume of material anticipated under the export/import mechanism, the broad framework under which the regime will operate is currently being established. When operational, the export-import mechanism will constitute one of the main pillars of the ongoing monitoring and verification regime, and the Commission and IAEA's experts in New York, Vienna and Baghdad will be heavily involved in reviewing and assessing the information provided by Iraq and exporting Governments under the mechanism.

7. To administer the mechanism there will be export/import units staffed by customs experts and data entry personnel in Baghdad and New York. These units will be responsible for receiving the notification forms, ensuring their timely and efficient processing by the Commission's and IAEA's experts as may be the case, and the dissemination of information. In Iraq, the customs experts, in conjunction with the monitoring experts, will also undertake no-notice inspections at, inter alia, points of entry into Iraq, in order to verify that all relevant items are being declared. In view of the commercial sensitivity of data supplied under the export/import regime, special measures will be taken to ensure the security of this data.

8. On the basis of the figures set out above, the Commission currently envisages recruiting six to eight additional experts for its New York staff to process and analyse the data generated by the mechanism.

Appendix III

Information Assessment Unit

The Information Assessment Unit is in the process of developing a new computer system which will form the key analytical tool for ongoing monitoring and verification and future export/import operations and analysis. The system will hold computerized versions of the site protocols, including declarations, inspection reports, imagery and maps. Work has already begun on creating a database to support export/import operations, which will be linked to the computerized site protocols, thus allowing the analysts to review items on order or being imported for each facility being monitored. In addition, the database will permit manipulation of information to allow assessments to be made on the total volume of items, such as dual-use chemicals, being imported into Iraq. In this manner, experts will at any time be able to make assessments about Iraq's potential capabilities to produce banned items, either at an individual site or throughout Iraq, and so will be better able to direct the Commission's monitoring of sites and imports to focus on the most significant issues.

Appendix IV

Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre

A. Concept and background information

1. On 1 August 1994, the Commission established the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. In part, its establishment enabled the Executive Chairman to declare the ongoing monitoring and verification system provisionally operational.

2. The Centre provides offices, laboratories, and operational support for Commission and IAEA resident inspectors. The resident staff includes professional specialists in biological, chemical, and nuclear issues; missiles; aerial photography and interpretation and camera and other sensor technology. In the near future, it will include experts in export/import control of dual-use items. The resident and visiting inspectors are supported by a small staff led by the Director of the Centre. It should be noted that the Centre not only offers office space and common support for the inspectors, but also affords the opportunity for inter-disciplinary analysis of the data available to experts. This opportunity has become increasingly evident during inspections conducted in November and December 1994.

3. The Centre is located in the Canal Hotel, a building made available by the Government of Iraq for the exclusive use of the United Nations in the mid-1980s. The facility is managed by the United Nations Administrative Unit, Baghdad, for a variety of United Nations organizations. At the proposal of the Executive Chairman of the Commission, Iraq agreed that the Canal Hotel should serve as the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.

B. Engineering support

4. Immediately prior to the beginning of the reporting period, the Commission undertook a survey of the engineering support required to reconfigure the designated area in the Canal Hotel in a manner suitable for the tasks of the Centre.

5. The survey also indicated that the Centre would require extensive engineering support in a number of areas:

(a) Reconfiguration of a large number of the rooms;

(b) Rewiring of the electrical circuits and repair of the plumbing for the offices;

(c) Physical barriers and control points needed to be installed at the numerous access points to ensure the security of the Centre.

6. In mid-July, the Al-Fao Construction Bureau was designated to perform the work. The indifferent quality of the workforce, the lack of qualified

supervisors and the need for remedial repairs delayed the completion of the work.

7. The Iraqi renovation project was observed by construction engineers provided by a contributing Government. Their assessment of the facility and of the many requirements within the Centre indicated that the scope of engineering support must be enlarged to correct the deficiencies of the initial renovation and to engage in other projects to complete the facility. At the same time, efforts were made to arrange for engineering support for the long term. A fundamental consideration for these arrangements was the establishment and maintenance of a secure facility. This important factor made it necessary for the Commission to approach several Member States for both near- and long-term engineering support.

8. As the current reporting period closes, contributing Governments have provided craftsmen in response to specific requests for assistance, namely, installing locks; surveying the electric power system; completing a two-stage electric rewiring project; building the work surfaces and shelving in the operations room, the aerial inspection team offices and the laboratories; and designing the electrical system for the biological laboratory.

C. Security measures

9. Concerns about Centre security arise from many sources. Security of information, analyses and deliberations within the Centre is an essential element of the efficacy of ongoing monitoring and verification. Information security must encompass not only the findings of inspectors, but also the proprietary data of the notifications submitted to the Commission by Iraq and by the exporting Governments concerning dual-use items. Physical security must provide assurance of control over all possible access points. A number of contributing Governments have made available technical experts and equipment to assist the Commission with its security programme.

D. Equipment and furniture donations

10. Contributing Governments of four States and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) have provided, and continue to provide equipment, including furniture, for the Centre. Two Governments donated furniture and expendable supplies from their former embassy compounds in Baghdad. ESCWA is lending large quantities of office furniture, which was in storage at the former ESCWA headquarters in Baghdad. A third Government is providing the internal security camera system, an important component to the security programme for the Centre, and a fourth Government has donated computers and associated equipment for use in Baghdad.

11. The monitoring systems that have been installed at sites selected for that purpose and that support the efforts of the resident and visiting inspectors have been donated by a Member State, and installed and maintained by its technicians with assistance from technicians from other Governments. Most of the camera systems include real-time transmission from the remote sites so that

the Centre may monitor system performance. It is expected that all remote cameras will incorporate this feature in the coming months. The Centre also receives data from associated sensors and from alarm devices that record interference with the monitoring. The contributing Governments have established an initial, periodic maintenance schedule, continually to ensure that the remote site systems are in working order.

E. Personnel of the Centre

12. The establishment of the Centre on 1 August was signified by the arrival of the first Director. The continuous presence of inspectors from a variety of disciplines has created new, and in many ways unforeseen, opportunities to enhance the Commission's capabilities and performance.

13. The Centre provides support for approximately 50 personnel in residence as well as support for a 31-person detachment of the German Army brigade that operates the Commission's three CH-53G helicopters. The number of resident experts will increase with the advent of the export/import mechanism. Visiting teams will temporarily expand the presence of the Commission and IAEA.

14. Recruitment of personnel for the Centre takes a variety of forms. Some Member States have made an ongoing commitment to make available a particular expertise. Most of the monitoring group inspectors are recruited through the Permanent Missions in New York. This continuous process of recruitment commenced formally with a presentation to over 20 Member States in late May 1994, and has worked well to provide personnel for all required positions in a timely manner during the reporting period.

F. Future developments

15. The complete establishment of the Centre will be but one factor in the full implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification. Plans are in hand to install all the currently envisaged equipment and laboratories required to support the full operation of the Centre by the end of February 1995. When the staff arrives to operate and maintain the new equipment, the Centre should be fully staffed and equipped. Adjustments to staffing levels will be made in line with requirements and in the light of experience gained in operating the ongoing monitoring and verification regime. The prime expansion currently envisaged will be the arrival of export/import experts at the appropriate time, in preparation for the operation of the export/import mechanism.

Appendix V

Administrative and financial issues

A. Organizational and administrative issues

1. Since the last report, there have been no further changes in the composition of the Special Commission.

2. The organizational structure remains essentially as reported previously. Currently there are 41 staff in the office of the Executive Chairman, 23 in the Bahrain field office, and 69 in the Baghdad field office.

3. Governments have continued to support the operation of the Commission through the contribution of personnel, services and equipment. These contributions have been essential to the work of the Commission in every area.

B. Status, privileges and immunities

4. The status, privileges and immunities of the Commission, IAEA and the specialized agencies involved in the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) continue to be regulated by the relevant agreements and Council resolutions and decisions.

5. The Commission and IAEA on the one hand and the Government of Bahrain on the other have extended for a further six months, until 31 March 1995, the agreement provided for in the earlier exchanges of letters relating to the facilities, privileges and immunities of the Commission and IAEA in Bahrain.

C. Finance

6. A full account of the financial difficulties which have confronted the Commission is contained in annex III to the report contained in S/1994/1138 and Corr. 1. The financial situation of the Commission remains an area of great concern in view of the difficulties in ensuring proper funding for the operations in a planned manner. At this time, the only commitments received from Member States for additional contributions have been $2.5 million from Kuwait and $40,000 from Switzerland. Other Member States in the Gulf region have expressed their continuing support for the work of the Commission and it is hoped that cash contributions will follow. It is also expected, as was the case in the past, that a portion of the matching transfer of frozen Iraqi assets from the United States of America to the escrow account will be made available to the Commission to cover some of its 1995 requirements. In the best possible circumstances, at this point, funds can be identified only for the first three months of 1995. Beyond that, there are no identified funds in the escrow account to cover the Commission's operations. Obviously, if further funds are not identified in the near future, the incremental shut-down of the Commission's operations, as indicated in the Commission's letter to the President of the Security Council of 3 November 1994, will ensue.

Appendix VI

INSPECTION SCHEDULE

(In-country dates)

Nuclear

15-21 May 1991	IAEA1/UNSCOM 1
22 June-3 July 1991	IAEA2/UNSCOM 4
7-18 July 1991	IAEA3/UNSCOM 5
27 July-10 August 1991	IAEA4/UNSCOM 6
14-20 September 1991	IAEA5/UNSCOM 14
21-30 September 1991	IAEA6/UNSCOM 16
11-22 October 1991	IAEA7/UNSCOM 19
11-18 November 1991	IAEA8/UNSCOM 22
11-14 January 1992	IAEA9/UNSCOM 25
5-13 February 1992	IAEA10/UNSCOM 27
7-15 April 1992	IAEA11/UNSCOM 33
26 May-4 June 1992	IAEA12/UNSCOM 37
14-21 July 1992	IAEA13/UNSCOM 41
31 August-7 September 1992	IAEA14/UNSCOM 43
8-19 November 1992	IAEA15/UNSCOM 46
6-14 December 1992	IAEA16/UNSCOM 47
22-27 January 1993	IAEA17/UNSCOM 49
3-11 March 1993	IAEA18/UNSCOM 52
30 April-7 May 1993	IAEA19/UNSCOM 56
25-30 June 1993	IAEA20/UNSCOM 58
23-28 July 1993	IAEA21/UNSCOM 61
1-9 November 1993	IAEA22/UNSCOM 64
4-11 February 1994	IAEA23/UNSCOM 68
11-22 April 1994	IAEA24/UNSCOM 73
21 June-1 July 1994	IAEA25/UNSCOM 83
22 August-2 September 1994	IAEA26/UNSCOM 90
7-29 September 1994	NMG 94-01
14-21 October 1994	IAEA27/UNSCOM 93
29 September-21 October 1994	NMG 94-02

21 October-9 November 1994	NMG 94-03
8-29 November 1994	NMG 94-04
29 November-16 December 1994	NMG 94-05
16 December 1994-13 January 1995	NMG 94-06

Chemical

9-15 June 1991	CW1/UNSCOM 2
15-22 August 1991	CW2/UNSCOM 9
31 August-8 September 1991	CW3/UNSCOM 11
31 August-5 September 1991	CW4/UNSCOM 12
6 October-9 November 1991	CW5/UNSCOM 17
22 October-2 November 1991	CW6/UNSCOM 20
18 November-1 December 1991	CBW1/UNSCOM 21
27 January-5 February 1992	CW7/UNSCOM 26
21 February-24 March 1992	CD1/UNSCOM 29
5-13 April 1992	CD2/UNSCOM 32
15-29 April 1992	CW8/UNSCOM 35
18 June 1992-14 June 1994	CDG/UNSCOM 38
26 June-10 July 1992	CBW2/UNSCOM 39
21-29 September 1992	CW9/UNSCOM 44
6-14 December 1992	CBW3/UNSCOM 47
6-18 April 1993	CW10/UNSCOM 55
27-30 June 1993	CW11/UNSCOM 59
19-22 November 1993	CW12/UNSCOM 65
1-14 February 1994	CW13/UNSCOM 67
20-26 March 1994	CW14/UNSCOM 70
18-22 April 1994	CW15/UNSCOM 74
25 May-5 June 1994	CW16/UNSCOM 75
31 May-12 June 1994	CW17/UNSCOM 76
8-14 June 1994	CW18/UNSCOM 77
10-23 August 1994	CW19/UNSCOM 89
13-24 September 1994	CW20/UNSCOM 91
2 October 1994-15 January 1995	CG 1
23-27 October 1994	CW21/UNSCOM 95

Biological

2-8 August 1991	BW1/UNSCOM 7
20 September-3 October 1991	BW2/UNSCOM 15
11-18 March 1993	BW3/UNSCOM 53
8-26 April 1994	BW4/UNSCOM 72
28 May-7 June 1994	BW5/UNSCOM 78
24 June-5 July 1994	BW6/UNSCOM 84
5-8 June 1994	BW7/UNSCOM 86
25 July-7 September 1994	BW8/UNSCOM 87
20-25 August 1994	BW9/UNSCOM 88
29 August-3 September 1994	BW10/UNSCOM 92
29 September-14 October 1994	BW11/UNSCOM 94
23-26 September 1994	BW12/UNSCOM 96
15-22 November 1994	BW15/UNSCOM 104
2-10 December 1994	BW16/UNSCOM 105 (IMT)
2-14 December 1994	BW13/UNSCOM 99 (IMT)
9-19 December 1994	BW17/UNSCOM 106 (IMT)
28 December 1994-31 January 1995	IBG 1

Ballistic missiles

30 June-7 July 1991	BM1/UNSCOM 3
18-20 July 1991	BM2/UNSCOM 10
8-15 August 1991	BM3/UNSCOM 8
6-13 September 1991	BM4/UNSCOM 13
1-9 October 1991	BM5/UNSCOM 18
1-9 December 1991	BM6/UNSCOM 23
9-17 December 1991	BM7/UNSCOM 24
21-29 February 1992	BM8/UNSCOM 28
21-29 March 1992	BM9/UNSCOM 31
13-21 April 1992	BM10/UNSCOM 34
14-22 May 1992	BM11/UNSCOM 36
11-29 July 1992	BM12/UNSCOM 40A+B
7-18 August 1992	BM13/UNSCOM 42
16-30 October 1992	BM14/UNSCOM 45
25 January-23 March 1993	IMT1a/UNSCOM 48

12-21 February 1993	BM15/UNSCOM 50
22-23 February 1993	BM16/UNSCOM 51
27 March-17 May 1993	IMT1b/UNSCOM 54
5-28 June 1993	IMT1c/UNSCOM 57
10-11 July 1993	BM17/UNSCOM 60
24 August-15 September 1993	BM18/UNSCOM 62
28 September-1 November 1993	BM19/UNSCOM 63
21-29 January 1994	BM20/UNSCOM 66
17-25 February 1994	BM21/UNSCOM 69
30 March-20 May 1994	BM22/UNSCOM 71
20 May-8 June 1994	BM23/UNSCOM 79
10-24 June 1994	BM24/UNSCOM 80
14-22 June 1994	BM25/UNSCOM 81
3-28 July 1994	BM26/UNSCOM 82
15-24 July 1994	BM27/UNSCOM 85
17 August-9 October 1994	MG 1
2-6 October 1994	BM28/UNSCOM 98A
23-28 October 1994	BM28/UNSCOM 98B
14 October 1994-2 February 1995	MG 2
19-22 October 1994	MG 2A
2-6 December 1994	MG 2B
1-6 December 1994}	BM29/UNSCOM 101
9-14 December 1994}	
9-16 December 1994	BM30/UNSCOM 102

Computer search

12 February 1992	UNSCOM 30

Special missions

30 June-3 July 1991
11-14 August 1991
4-6 October 1991
11-15 November 1991
27-30 January 1992
21-24 February 1992

17-19 July 1992

28-29 July 1992

6-12 September 1992

4-9 November 1992

4-8 November 1992

12-18 March 1993

14-20 March 1993

19-24 April 1993

4 June-5 July 1993

15-19 July 1993

25 July-5 August 1993

9-12 August 1993

10-24 September 1993

27 September-1 October 1993

1-8 October 1993

5 October-16 February 1994

2-10 December 1993

2-16 December 1993

21-27 January 1994

2-6 February 1994

10-14 April 1994

24-26 April 1994

28-29 May 1994

4-6 July 1994

8-16 August 1994

15-19 September 1994

21-25 September 1994

23-26 September 1994

3-6 October 1994

4-20 November 1994

7-12 November 1994

14-17 November 1994

4-18 December 1994

14-20 December 1994